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Abstract 14 
The role that deficient institutional relationships have played in aggravating drinking 15 
water incidents over the last 30 years has been identified in several inquiries of high profile 16 
drinking water safety events, peer-reviewed articles and media reports.  These indicate that 17 
collaboration between water utilities and public health agencies (PHAs) during normal 18 
operations, and in emergencies, needs improvement.  Here, critical elements of these 19 
interagency collaborations, that can be integrated within the corporate risk management 20 
structures of water utilities and PHAs alike, were identified using a grounded theory approach 21 
and 51 semi-structured interviews with utility and PHA staff.  Core determinants of effective 22 
interagency relationships are discussed.  Intentionally maintained functional relationships 23 
represent a key ingredient in assuring the delivery of safe, high quality drinking water.  24 
 25 
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1. Introduction 1 
Public health protection must be the principal goal of a drinking water utility (IWA, 2 
2004; WHO, 2011).  The goal to provide safe drinking water in sufficient quantity and at 3 
good aesthetic quality (IWA, 2004) may be challenged by a plethora of natural and man-4 
made adverse events and hazards, either in the catchment, or along the water treatment and 5 
distribution chain.  These include drought, floods, fires, storms and hurricanes, spring melting 6 
and runoff, animal or human faecal contamination, algal blooms, chemical or radiological 7 
leaks, water treatment equipment failure, pipe breaks, operator error, vandalism, terrorism, 8 
and so on (Bartram et al., 2009; Emde et al., 2006; Herrick et al., 2006; Hrudey and Hrudey, 9 
2004; IWA, 2004; Jalba et al., 2009; Pollard et al., 2007; USEPA, 2004b; WHO, 2011).  For 10 
many utilities, the goal of public health protection is challenged by a wide range of other 11 
business risks.  Water utilities must remain ecologically, environmentally and economically 12 
sustainable, as well as financially profitable and competitive for private water companies 13 
(CEC, 2000; Middleton and Saunders, 1997; Pollard et al., 2009; Pollard et al., 2007).  14 
Finally, as providers of an essential public health service, water companies must preserve 15 
regulatory as well as consumer trust, having to manage multiple perception risks, irrespective 16 
of their tangible health impacts (IWA, 2004; Mobley et al., 2006; Parkin et al., 2006; Parkin 17 
et al., 2004; Pollard et al., 2009).  All these risks need to be assessed and integrated at 18 
corporate level, and the water utility must prevent and/or manage them to protect public 19 
health (Bartram et al., 2009; IWA, 2004; Jalba et al., 2009; Maxwell, 2004; Pollard et al., 20 
2009; USEPA, 2004a; WHO, 2011; Pollard et al., 2013). 21 
Trade-offs are a necessary requirement of drinking water management (Hrudey, 2004), 22 
but the clarity of strategic corporate objectives may suffer under the complexities of 23 
regulatory incentives, organizational structures, the debt financing of the asset base and split 24 
accountabilities (e.g. outsourcing) (Pollard et al., 2009; Pollard et al., 2007).  Furthermore, 25 
risk factors that might compromise the overarching mission can lie undetected within 26 
organizations, acting as latent precursors for water quality incidents and other adverse events 27 
(Pollard et al., 2009; Reason, 1997).  Managing risk, therefore, is more complex than just 28 
optimizing asset management, completing risk registers, ensuring compliance or managing 29 
chemicals in catchments; it requires vigilance at all levels within a utility, focused around 30 
unambiguous business goals (Pollard, 2008). 31 
Some of these challenges can be addressed technically, for example, by installing better 32 
water treatment and upgrading infrastructure, developing new technological solutions for new 33 
and emerging pathogens or through better water quality monitoring systems (Rizak and 34 
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Hrudey, 2007; USEPA, 2005; WHO, 2011).  Others are business-related and require 1 
sustainable and environmentally responsible strategies, new ways to maintain profitability, 2 
and to ensure occupational health and safety (Pollard et al., 2004; 2007).  Others involve 3 
responding to external challenges such as ensuring consumer satisfaction, collaborating with 4 
stakeholders (including regulatory agencies) and through well-managed media relations 5 
(Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004; Hrudey et al., 2006; Jalba et al., 2009).  There are also challenges 6 
for emergency management and catchment protection that involve a combination of 7 
technical, business and external solutions (Bartram et al., 2009; Jalba et al., 2009). 8 
We have previously identified six components that may be deficient in the relationship 9 
between affected water utilities and their respective public health authorities (PHAs): (1) 10 
proactivity; (2) knowledge exchange; (3) trust; (4) regular communication; (5) joint training; 11 
and (6) a supportive regulatory environment (Jalba et al., 2010).  We indicated that 12 
international and national guidelines, supportive regulations, and local communication 13 
arrangements do not, by themselves, guarantee effective interagency collaboration, though 14 
they do present opportunities to develop meaningful (as opposed to cursory or superficial) 15 
collaboration (Jalba et al., 2010).  We distinguished a collaborative strategy (intent) from a 16 
collaborative structure (for delivery).  To be effective, any structure must adopt an agreed 17 
strategy (Krames, 2008); that is, the relationship must have a defined purpose and a means of 18 
achieving it. 19 
Here, we report findings from in-depth interviews with senior drinking water and PHA 20 
managers from a selection of reputable organisations from Australia, Canada, the United 21 
States, and the United Kingdom, on the topic of achieving effective interagency 22 
collaborations.  Many of the participating organisations had been involved in managing 23 
drinking water incidents that challenged their existing collaborative agreements and provided 24 
lessons and opportunities to optimize their approach.  To our knowledge, this is the first in-25 
depth study of this kind, and the research has broad international relevance for researchers, 26 
practitioners and policy-makers seeking to strengthen water safety, business resilience and 27 
risk governance in the international water sector. 28 
Prior research has identified a number of drivers, tools and determinants governing 29 
successful inter-organisational collaboration relevant to the area of drinking water.  Rather 30 
than explore failings, that have been addressed elsewhere by the authors, our aim here was to 31 
identify effective practices..  Building on the work of Hrudey and Hrudey (2004), Parkin et 32 
al.(2006), Cash et al. (2003), and Thomson et al. (2009), we seek to identify the critical 33 
elements of interagency collaboration that can be integrated in the overall corporate risk 34 
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management approach of water utilities (Pollard, 2013) and PHAs alike,  principally for the 1 
purposes of promoting a standard for meaningful interactions between utilities and agencies 2 
as a means of helping them discharge their mandates successfully.  We offer insights to an 3 
international audience on (i) the critical institutional relationship deficiencies that may 4 
aggravate a drinking water and health emergency situation; (ii) the determinants of a 5 
successful effective relationship between a water utility and its respective PHA(s); and (iii) 6 
how an effective collaborative relationship can be integrated with the risk management 7 
culture of a water utility as an effective means of delivery. 8 
 9 
2. Methods 10 
2.1.  Study rationale and participants 11 
We employed a qualitative research methodology (Miller et al., 2004; Morse and Field, 12 
1995; Silverman, 2001).  An ethnographic approach would have unnecessarily broadened 13 
data collection, and participant observation.  Observing single water professionals in public 14 
health risk management would have been unrealistic, since most utilities may not even 15 
experience one drinking water and health incident per year serious enough to warrant a 16 
significant interaction with their PHA.  Drinking water and health incidents in affluent 17 
countries are rare and unpredictable; therefore, field research would have produced limited 18 
data.  Our choice was to adopt a grounded theory method (GTM) adapted to the risk 19 
management focus of this research (Trochim, 2006).  Participating organisations from 20 
English-speaking countries were selected based on being organisations: (i) covering various 21 
geographical areas, in terms of climate, water resources, cultural profile, urbanisation and 22 
socio-economic development; (ii) operating in various jurisdictions, with different laws and 23 
regulations relevant to the aims of the study (e.g. regulatory environment, regulatory 24 
agencies, emergency preparedness, specific safe drinking water legislation); and (iii) able to 25 
provide a water utility – PHA pairing.  Interviewees (see Supplementary Information, SI-T1) 26 
were selected based on them: (iv) occupying key risk management positions in their 27 
organisation; and (v) working at the interface with other agencies in relation to public health 28 
risks.  Atypical participants were accepted for comparison and contrast (e.g. former 29 
occupants of key positions). 30 
 31 
2.2.  Data collection and analysis 32 
Using purposive sampling, we conducted 40 in-person, semi-structured interviews 33 
employing open-ended questions between November 2006 and March 2008.  Overall, we 34 
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interviewed 51 professionals from Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United 1 
States (SI_T1).  Questions were organized in six sections (general institutional data, risk 2 
management policy and implementation, interagency relationships, past incidents and near-3 
misses of public health relevance, emergency management, and training and assistance).  4 
Prior ethics approval for the study design, interviews and the handling of research data was 5 
secured through Flinders University Social and Behavioural Research Ethics Committee. 6 
The research instrument was tested through a pilot interview with a typical participant, 7 
and reviewed before data collection began.  Minor adjustments were employed to add clarity.  8 
Our analysis sought to identify current critical gaps and constructive processes that would 9 
cover the shortcomings recognized in the survey of past drinking water and health incidents 10 
described above.  When opportunity occurred during interviews, additional incidents and 11 
unpublished aspects of some incidents identified through previous literature survey were 12 
clarified with reference to interagency relationships.  Concepts were identified according to 13 
the lead author’s (DJ) judgement.  They were reviewed and verified with public health and 14 
drinking water experts.  Purposive sampling may have limited the generalisation of our 15 
results to the water industry as a whole, but the consistency of our findings provides evidence 16 
of recurrent themes that segments of the water industry and PHAs ought to consider when 17 
seeking to improve interagency relationships.  Our GTM approach was iterative (Goulding, 18 
2002).  Systematic analysis of qualitative data (e.g. interview conversations) sought to 19 
develop a supportable means of answering our research questions, and was achieved through 20 
coding, memo-ing, and concept mapping.  Interview data was initially open-coded, with 21 
selective coding employed later as concepts developed.  In addition to triangulation within 22 
the research team, study findings were reviewed by independent water experts from each 23 
participating country, including an US-based water industry expert panel who confirmed the 24 
relevance of critical data categories used during the analysis and validated study findings. 25 
 26 
3. Results 27 
Our findings present the high level principles that transcend national regulatory 28 
environments, operating structures, legal entities and local cultures.  Where appropriate, 29 
divergent findings between similar organisations in different countries are reported.  Our 30 
main results are presented and discussed below, with additional survey results presented in 31 
the Supporting Information (SI) online.  The references section contains a full bibliography 32 
for the main text and SI and is intended  a bibliographic reference to readers on this specific 33 
topic of interest. 34 
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 1 
3.1. Risk management culture 2 
Most commonly, water utilities defined their mission as providing safe and aesthetically 3 
pleasant, high quality drinking water.  Other aspects included cost-efficiency, excellent and 4 
reliable service, and environmental responsibility.  PHA representatives most often defined 5 
their organisation’s mission on drinking water as being to protect public health by ensuring 6 
safe drinking water and minimising human public exposure to drinking water hazards.  Other 7 
aspects mentioned were being informed early of drinking water events that may affect public 8 
health, working with water utilities, and coordinating emergency response. 9 
Interviewees were asked to self-assess the development of a ‘risk management approach’ 10 
to drinking water in their organisation.  Half of water utility interviewees stated they followed 11 
a formal risk management approach to drinking water at all levels.  Minority views included 12 
beliefs they were employing a risk management approach for individual water systems, but 13 
not at corporate level (one-sixth) or alternatively, that they were employing a risk 14 
management approach at corporate level, but not related directly to drinking water (one-15 
sixth).  Most notably, one quarter of interviewees reported not employing a formal risk 16 
management approach at all in their organisation; this view mostly expressed by the United 17 
States and some Canadian utilities.  However, all interviewees reported having developed 18 
emergency response plans (ERPs) for their drinking water operations. 19 
By contrast, over half of PHA interviewees reported not employing a formal risk 20 
management approach within their organisations; such responses came from PHAs from all 21 
participating countries.  One quarter of interviewees, although not having a formal risk 22 
management approach for drinking water, were promoting water safety plans (WSPs) among 23 
water utilities in their jurisdiction, whilst the remainder reported employing a formal risk 24 
management approach at corporate level, but not specifically for drinking water.  One quarter 25 
of total PHA interviewees, however, reported having developed ‘vulnerability assessments’ 26 
related to water security in their jurisdiction, most commonly in the US. 27 
While most water utility interviewees affirmed they regularly apply risk management in 28 
taking public health decisions, in many cases this would refer more to having standard 29 
operating procedures (SOPs) or manuals rather than an explicit, risk-based approach to 30 
issues.  The same applied to some of the PHAs interviewed, while the majority would 31 
typically refer to the public health precautionary principles and paradigm.  Only a few PHA 32 
representatives expressed the importance of risk trade-offs when dealing with environmental 33 
health issues. 34 
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Most UK utilities and one Canadian utility reported having their risk managers focused 1 
on business risks.  These utilities have in place formal comprehensive risk management 2 
programs for the whole business, whose focus is often on financial and commercial risk.  3 
Public health risk is rarely elaborated explicitly, although most organizations would have 4 
public health included in their mission statement and principles.  In contrast, most US and 5 
Canadian utilities did not have a centralised risk management program or a risk management 6 
policy document at the time of interview (i.e. June 2007 and November 2006, respectively).  7 
Their organisational culture seemed to be driven primarily by regulatory requirements that 8 
promote compliance monitoring rather than overall risk management.  Half of these utilities 9 
practiced implicit risk management by adopting proactive programs to address certain high-10 
risk segments (e.g. cross-connections).  Identified risk managers would usually focus on 11 
emergency preparedness for potential terrorism and natural disasters, and on health and 12 
safety. 13 
The use of risk terminology does not necessarily imply a risk management ‘culture’ 14 
(Pollard et al., 2007) and the meaning that interviewees attributed to risk concepts seemed to 15 
vary greatly.  A consistent and mutually agreed application of risk management principles to 16 
public health risks by both sides remains elusiveand this may well lead to uneven 17 
participation in decision-making, with one party having to more-or-less accept what the 18 
‘experts’ on the other side have already agreed on. 19 
 20 
3.2. Interagency relationships 21 
3.2.1. Partner risk management approach 22 
Most utility interviewees considered their respective PHAs did not employ a risk 23 
management approach in the activity of their own organisation related to drinking water 24 
safety.  In one US case, the interviewee believed their PHA would use risk management for 25 
water security.  Many utility interviewees regarded PHAs as being risk-averse, whereas risk 26 
‘management’ for a PHA might be interpreted as a need to weaken public health protection 27 
standards.  This seemed to relate to the precautionary paradigm that a typical PHA would use 28 
(Emde et al., 2006; Jalba and Hrudey, 2006) reflected in these cases by a reluctance to 29 
recognise explicit risk trade-offs.  By contrast, two interviewees recognised that implicit 30 
trade-offs remain a necessary part of providing a water service that need not compromise 31 
overall public health protection. 32 
Water utility answers were generally confirmed by PHA interviewees in paired 33 
organisations.  No PHA staff reported explicit risk management in their own organisation as 34 
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it relates to their own activity of supervising drinking water safety, although a few expressed 1 
a belief that they practice risk management  implicitly.  The most common answer, of about 2 
half of PHA interviewees, was that they do not know whether they use a risk management 3 
approach.  While the question of implicit risk management remains open, the PHA answers 4 
clearly indicated their organisations had no systematic approach to risk management. 5 
In paired organisations, half of the PHA interviewees believed their utility counterparts 6 
follow a risk management approach, while most of the remainder affirmed ignorance on this 7 
point.  In two cases, the PHA interviewees expressed a belief that the utility follows a risk 8 
management approach, whereas the respective utility representatives disagreed.  Conversely, 9 
a formal risk management approach was employed in a quarter of paired utilities, but their 10 
PHA counterparts did not recognise this.  In only three cases did both parties agree that the 11 
respective utilities follow a structured, formalised risk management approach that was 12 
confirmed upon further probing. 13 
Many interviewees, particularly on the PHA side, were not very familiar with risk 14 
management concepts and their application to drinking water safety.  The language of risk 15 
has often been employed liberally, to mean anything from emergency protocols to public 16 
communication, but not necessarily to the adoption of a formalised risk management 17 
approach to assure prevention, mitigation and control of drinking water incidents.  The 18 
limited recognition of the role of risk management in the area of drinking water quality may 19 
help explain contradictory statements in paired organisations about what their counterpart 20 
does on risk management.  This finding raises doubts about whether the interactions resulted 21 
in meaningful knowledge transfer and truly promoted prevention in all aspects related to 22 
drinking water incidents. 23 
 24 
3.2.2. Quality of interagency collaborations 25 
All interviewees self-characterised their inter-organisational relationship as positive, in 26 
varying degrees.  To some extent, this may represent a sampling bias related to their 27 
agreement to be interviewed for this research.  Because participation in the study was 28 
voluntary, professionals were more comfortable with their interagency relationships and may 29 
have been more likely to accept participation.  In some cases, interviewees from both sides 30 
appreciated their relationship was somewhat restricted by the limited interest of the PHA in 31 
drinking water issues, compared to other demanding public health matters (e.g, sexually-32 
transmitted diseases, illicit drug use, food safety, chronic illnesses, immunisations).  Finally, 33 
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changes in the quality of the relationship, resulting from key staff changes, indicated that the 1 
institutional relationship was frequently immature and relied on personal connections. 2 
The two sets of interviewees generally matched each other in terms of the reported 3 
intensity of interaction.  In particular, approximately half from each side estimated they were 4 
in weekly contact with their counterparts.  At the other extreme, a significant finding was that 5 
in a minority of participating organisations, the relationship is driven only by drinking water 6 
safety incidents, i.e. it is entirely reactive. 7 
Identifiable results of institutional cooperation (such as joint emergency response 8 
protocols, other written agreements or joint projects) were reported by each side, with utility 9 
interviewees reporting activities in a higher proportion than their PHA counterparts.  This is 10 
not necessarily surprising since not all organisations were paired in this study, and even in 11 
paired organisations cooperative activities were not always equally reported by both parties.  12 
However, the comparatively less frequent reporting by PHAs of concrete activities that 13 
demonstrate cooperation (beyond discussing compliance monitoring results), may suggest 14 
that issues beyond strict compliance are viewed as less important to their interaction.  Actors 15 
engaged in a meaningful, as opposed to cursory or superficial, interaction would be more 16 
likely to recognise such activities as central to the purpose of developing a mature, stable 17 
institutional relationship. 18 
As a further step in formalising the institutional relationship, several Australian utilities 19 
had developed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with their state health departments.  The 20 
content of these MoUs varied, but generally defined roles and responsibilities for each party 21 
during both normal times and in emergencies, formalised information exchange, and 22 
mandated regular contact and cooperation.  Creating an MoU was a condition set in the 23 
operating licence for these utilities.  Among interviewees from the other countries, there was 24 
only one identified case in the US, a tri-lateral agreement between the water utility, state and 25 
county PHA that defined roles and expectations during normal and emergency times.  26 
Another tri-lateral MoU was identified in one UK case between the water utility, water 27 
quality regulator and environmental regulator in relation to catchment management 28 
arrangements. 29 
 30 
3.2.3. Relationship development 31 
Several interviewees commented that before the 1990s, it was generally assumed that 32 
water utilities had all the expertise necessary to produce safe water, and they were expected 33 
to operate without much need for external input.  This approach was not optimal for 34 
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protecting public health.  For example, several Canadian participants (from both utilities and 1 
PHAs) insisted that the deficient relationship between oversight agencies and the Walkerton 2 
water system operators (O'Connor, 2002a) was typical for the kind of relationships that PHAs 3 
had with water utilities during the 1980s and 1990s.  Another participant stated, in this 4 
context: “In 1995 I went to a health inspectors conference in Ontario on the topic of water 5 
and I asked the audience how many have visited a water treatment plant – nobody put their 6 
hand up.  In the 90s all that the health departments would do is look at the water results, but 7 
never went to a water treatment plant to understand the system. To me that did not make any 8 
sense, because you cannot judge the water only based on a 200mL sample”. 9 
Most interviewees indicated that relationships between water utilities and PHAs have 10 
developed gradually in the past two decades.  Various events helped shape that process, 11 
providing more visionary managers with opportunities for strengthening the institutional 12 
relationship (Table 1). 13 
[TABLE 1 HERE PLEASE] 14 
 15 
Most water utility interviewees reported the institutional relationship developing because 16 
both parties had responded to a significant drinking water and health incident (Table 2). 17 
Relationships between the two parties prior to the respective event were never reported as 18 
antagonistic.  In most cases, both organisations had been operating for many years, with 19 
limited input from the other party.  For some utilities the importance of having a meaningful, 20 
ongoing contact with the PHA became clear after they ‘came under fire’ from media and 21 
concerned citizen groups for failing to provide a satisfactory response to issues such as 22 
protecting AIDS patients from exposure to Cryptosporidium, or children from lead 23 
contamination in the water supply.  In one case, political interference disrupted the incident 24 
command process by adding pressure to an already stressful situation, by setting unrealistic 25 
expectations (e.g. shorter timelines for lab results than can scientifically be expected, since 26 
bacteria do not grow as fast as politicians may want them to), and by trying to influence 27 
public health decisions. 28 
The respective incidents nevertheless triggered, on both sides, a realisation of the 29 
importance of establishing a regular relationship prior to incidents in order to improve future 30 
responses.  Generally, the critical incident was resolved without serious public health 31 
consequences.  However, difficulties occurred during the process relating to 32 
misunderstandings, unnecessary mutual criticism, distrust and unnecessary delays resulting, 33 
among others, from uncertainty about what the other party does or was intending to do. 34 
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Lastly, a role for relationship advocates (committed managers) emerged as a prominent 1 
factor.  Over half of the paired organisations recognised the role that committed managers on 2 
both sides had over the years in seeking ways to connect, define, maintain and strengthen the 3 
bilateral relationship.  While the relationship was eventually formalised through bilateral 4 
agreements in only half of the cases described in interviews, in all these cases the relationship 5 
was regular and meaningful. 6 
 7 
3.3. Emergency management 8 
No systematic approach to addressing specific relationship components through targeted 9 
scenarios was identified by participating utilities.  Exercise scenarios seemed to be designed 10 
and driven primarily by operational needs and the emergency concerns of the moment.  The 11 
purpose of developing relationship elements (e.g. trust) was not addressed, but either 12 
assumed to pre-exist or expected to develop naturally in the course of operational exercises.  13 
Furthermore, many utilities seemed to have formulated emergency preparedness plans, but 14 
not actually tested them.  Interagency relations were not always addressed in the planning.  15 
Practising these plans by superficially going through the steps in the protocol provides little 16 
assurance that the adequate organisational culture, institutional communication and support 17 
systems are in place to support effective emergency response. 18 
Organising more complex exercises or drills does require more effort, but meaningful 19 
practise provides organisations with the opportunity to identify weaknesses and update their 20 
plans.  On the other hand, a passive attitude and relying on external bodies to organise such 21 
exercises may leave many significant relationship gaps unmitigated.  For example, scenarios 22 
such as malicious contamination of the water source may be popular with emergency services 23 
agencies but are unlikely to be representative for the typical challenges that utilities (and 24 
PHAs) are confronted with more commonly in their efforts to maintain a safe drinking water 25 
supply. 26 
As an example of an ineffective way to organise an exercise, in one case the municipality 27 
organized an emergency preparedness drill using a scenario of intentional contamination of 28 
the source water with cyanide.  The drill involved various city agencies and the local PHA, 29 
but the city water utility was not involved in either the planning or execution stages.  Thirty 30 
minutes into the exercise it was realized that it was extremely difficult to introduce enough 31 
chemical contaminant into the water supply to pose a credible health threat to the population; 32 
thus the scenario made little sense.  The exercise was abandoned.  The scenario should have 33 
been developed with expertise from the utility, and should have employed priority risks from 34 
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within their vulnerability assessment process.  For optimal effect, the scenario should have 1 
been designed in a manner that would challenge interagency relationships, such as when 2 
available data on contamination is limited and subject to divergent interpretations from 3 
various professional perspectives (e.g. water system engineering vs. public health).  PHAs 4 
were, in general, less involved in testing their emergency preparedness arrangements in 5 
relation to drinking water than were utilities.  This is consistent with earlier reported findings 6 
about PHAs being less committed to the institutional relationship development in this area 7 
compared to utilities, because of their competing public health priorities.  All participating 8 
water utilities would inform their respective PHA immediately if public health consequences 9 
from consuming drinking water were suspected, such as from adverse monitoring results, a 10 
water treatment barrier failure, or a source water contamination event.  The same would apply 11 
for security incidents, even if no contamination was detected.  The utility would then seek 12 
PHA input on assessing health risks.  Most utilities indicated that they would prefer to take 13 
proactive steps regardless of possible reputation damage, even to calling a boil water advisory 14 
(BWA), thus demonstrating due diligence.  One utility participant commented: “Due 15 
diligence approach means that we prefer to take action, e.g. call a BWA, even if uncertain. In 16 
a court, I’d rather defend myself on the basis that as soon as we heard of this, we took action, 17 
rather than explain that we waited for two weeks to tell the public – much higher liability!” 18 
Participants were also questioned on whom they would expect to lead risk 19 
communication to the public in drinking water and health incidents.  There was limited 20 
consensus on this issue even in the same country, and not even in paired organisations.  21 
Generally, water utilities would hope that the PHA takes the lead for public health 22 
notifications and related public communication, but only a few utilities had formal 23 
arrangements with PHA in this regard. 24 
Research interviews included a section where the interviewer (DJ) introduced between 25 
one and three scenarios based on past drinking water incidents and adapted to local 26 
conditions and asked the interviewee to comment on aspects of their emergency response 27 
related to institutional collaboration.  On analysis of interview responses to these adapted 28 
incidents, those interviewees from organizations with a formalised and structured approach to 29 
their relationship with PHAs generally seemed to have better appreciation of the mutual 30 
needs and the challenges that an incident would present to their relationship.  By contrast, 31 
interviewees from utilities characterised by a more improvisational approach to risk 32 
management and interagency relations failed to observe potential relationship challenges (e.g. 33 
miscommunication, conflicting interpretations of limited data available, political interference) 34 
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and sometimes projected an unwarranted over-confidence in their ability to manage 1 
relationships during an incident.  Similar attitudes were present in the utilities involved in 2 
past incidents that experienced relationship difficulties. Unwarranted confidence, in 3 
particular, was noted previously in several incidents (Jalba et al., 2010). 4 
 5 
3.4. Mutual expectations 6 
To better understand relationship determinants, we explored the expectations of water 7 
utilities and PHAs in a drinking water incident from each others’ perspectives.  PHA 8 
expectations of the water utility are summarised comparatively to utility beliefs about the 9 
same in Table 2.  Utility expectations and beliefs of the PHA are listed in Table 3. 10 
 11 
[TABLE 2 HERE PLEASE] 12 
 13 
[TABLE 3 HERE PLEASE] 14 
 15 
The expectations in Tables 2 and 3 helped identify many grey areas where the 16 
responsibility is either shared, expected to be shared, or may be an overlapping area of 17 
interest that only becomes apparent in a more challenging incident.  Prominent examples 18 
include dealing with unusual contaminants, public notification or linking epidemiological 19 
analysis with water system operational findings. 20 
Many of the expectations listed in the tables are not easy to fulfil for every incident.  The 21 
analysis of incidents presented previously (Jalba et al., 2010) indicate that utilities sometimes 22 
experience difficulties in relation to identifying and isolating the source of the contamination, 23 
unconditionally supporting a prolonged or ‘blanket’ boil order (i.e. precautionary covering 24 
many areas where the risk is highly unlikely, but cannot be entirely excluded), deciding what 25 
is the appropriate amount of information that needs to be shared with other agencies, or 26 
corroborating epidemiologically-derived indications of water supply contamination with 27 
evidence of possible water system barrier failures. 28 
On the PHA side, there were equal indications of potential difficulties on expectations 29 
such as providing the location of cases (for privacy concerns); assessing population health 30 
impact; providing health education on water safety risks; justifying the epidemiological link 31 
of an outbreak to the water supply beyond reasonable doubt; presenting a unified front in 32 
public when there is disagreement or uncertainty related to the source of population exposure 33 
to a contaminant; judging the risk of transmission via water in comparison with other 34 
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exposure pathways; appreciating the potential of certain pathogens to be transmitted through 1 
the water supply; and even providing laboratory support for detecting pathogens that may be 2 
routinely detected in clinical samples but for which a detection method from water samples 3 
may not be available (e.g. emerging pathogens, or pathogens that are usually not transmitted 4 
through water).  In particular, several PHA interviewees appreciated that typical medical and 5 
public health training often does not sufficiently cover drinking water treatment, 6 
environmental health risk assessment and risk management to enable public health personnel 7 
to respond appropriately to some of the above expectations, such as advising on water 8 
treatment improvements; treatment removal effectiveness for new or emerging pathogens, for 9 
pathogens that are usually not transmitted via water, or for new or unusual chemicals that 10 
may contaminate the supply; or providing a health risk assessment for some of the previously 11 
mentioned categories of chemicals or pathogens.  Of note, most participating organisations 12 
failed to recognise many of the expectations that the other party may have for them.  A 13 
reasonable matching of expectations was only identified in six cases of paired organisations 14 
(out of fourteen pairs). 15 
 16 
4. Discussion 17 
In a world of increasing interdependence, good inter-organisational collaboration plays 18 
an important role in fulfilling the mission for most organisations (Bardach, 1998; Gray, 19 
1989).  This applies to all players in drinking water, particularly water utilities and their 20 
oversight agencies (IWA, 2004; Parkin et al., 2006).  While the technical task of producing 21 
drinking water belongs to the water utility only, the mission of producing “good safe drinking 22 
water that has the trust of consumers” (IWA 2004) requires the cooperative effort between a 23 
utility and its stakeholders, particularly public health agencies.  In developing countries, 24 
institutional disagreements about this responsibility (WHO, 2000) represent a significant 25 
barrier to water supply management. 26 
A critical aspect of institutional sustainability is the capability to manage risks.  A 27 
comprehensive risk management approach can be achieved by including several risk 28 
categories (namely financial, commercial, public health, environmental, reputation and legal 29 
risks) along with operational risks (Pollard et al., 2004; 2013).  An optimal relationship with 30 
PHAs aims to prevent not only public health, but also reputational and legal risks.  Good 31 
relationships with water regulators are vital to building consumer confidence (IWA, 2004; 32 
Pollard et al., 2004).  Developing an effective collaborative relationship with PHAs may be 33 
regarded as one of the critical tests of the maturity of the overall risk management culture in a 34 
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water utility (IWA, 2004; Williams and Hrudey, 2007).  Good interagency relations become 1 
critical to the recognised stages of drinking water incidents (WHO, 2008).  In the proactive 2 
stage, regulatory agencies provide feedback, endorsement and verification of safety measures 3 
taken.  In the initial alarm stage, these agencies provide advice and verification that relevant 4 
action is taken. In the management/control stage, they may continue to provide advice, and 5 
undertake their own verification that objectives of the intervention are achieved.  In the post-6 
incident stage, their role is to ensure that the initial risk is controlled, and that measures are in 7 
place to prevent future incidents.  The risk management process also recognises a proactive,  8 
analytical phase (resulting in a risk estimate) as well as a deliberative phase which involves 9 
stakeholders’ input (Glicken-Turnley, 2002).  Major stakeholders would include internal 10 
stakeholders (various departments in the utility that may have a stake in the issue, e.g. 11 
operations, water quality, risk management, public relations) as well as external stakeholders 12 
(e.g. public health and environmental regulators, water resources agency, water vendors, 13 
contractors, medical and health care professionals, consumer groups, community leadership).  14 
Depending on the cause, severity and impact of the incident, other important stakeholders 15 
include the Government emergency services agency, law enforcement, local politicians and 16 
the media (Bartram et al., 2009; Jalba et al., 2009).  Proactively developing good relations 17 
with stakeholders during normal times is much easier than during an incident where time is 18 
limited, stakes high, and communication cautious. 19 
Establishing the safety of drinking water involves more than just water technology.  The 20 
subjective nature of risk engages perceptions, depending on the various meanings of risk held 21 
by different stakeholders (Aven, 2010).  Confidence in the safety of the water supply relies 22 
on interpretation from various viewpoints, depending on trust, being up-to-date on emerging 23 
pollutants and pathogens, and being well-informed.  Events or developments that may impact 24 
water quality reported in our interviews, such as human or animal bodies drowned in the 25 
water source, toxic spills from accidents happening near the catchment (e.g. highway 26 
accidents), or accidents happening during recreational, industrial or agricultural activities in 27 
the catchment, highlighting the importance of having good relationships with stakeholders. 28 
In the absence of pre-established agreements on incident management, multiple points of 29 
contact with the media may result in conflicting messages being passed on from the various 30 
actors in the management of the drinking water incident, which can easily fuel media and 31 
public speculation about the real gravity of the event, the competence of responders or the 32 
success of control measures (Jalba et al., 2010).  Political interference may occur, and delay 33 
or undermine the efforts of the incident control team if cooperation between stakeholders is 34 
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not well-structured and tested in advance (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004; Scottish Executive, 1 
2002).  Lastly, poor public communication (Jalba et al., 2010) may aggravate the public 2 
health consequences of the incident (Hunter and Reid, 2005). 3 
In a drinking water incident, regulatory agencies themselves are likely to come under 4 
pressure from public, media and politicians.  Good institutional relationships, particularly 5 
regulatory trust, are important for maintaining a unified ‘front’ against cross-criticism.  6 
Regardless, regulatory agencies typically have the last word as to whether the incident 7 
response was optimal or not.  A true partnership often includes joint weathering of adversity 8 
in the cases where there is public and/or political dissatisfaction to incident response. 9 
 10 
4.1. What determines effective interagency relationships? 11 
In a drinking water emergency, all players depend on each other for critical information 12 
related to incident investigation, contamination control and public communication (Parkin et 13 
al., 2006; WHO, 2011).  Many study participants indicated a crisis is the most difficult time 14 
for building relationships.  Because of public interest in the matter, this relationship has to 15 
withstand sustained pressure from public, media and politicians.  We suggest an effective 16 
collaborative relationship must recognise a preventive framework similar to the multiple-17 
barrier approach advocated internationally for managing drinking water quality, meaning that 18 
all six relationship components we introduced (Jalba et al., 2010) are necessary for optimal 19 
institutional relationships.  A failure in any of these presents a relationship risk, even if the 20 
other components may eventually provide enough control to prevent an interagency incident 21 
(i.e. close-call).  Moreover, the components must be achieved in a meaningful, not a cursory 22 
or superficial, way.  For example, mutual understanding includes an understanding of 23 
regulatory roles and good personal relationships, but also understanding the other party’s 24 
working environment, their expectations, and even how to best present the information shared 25 
in a format that is most helpful to them.  A collaborative attitude and top management 26 
support further creates the conditions for the continuity of the relationship.  Finally, active 27 
implementation and structure firmly establishes the relationship, thus supporting consistency, 28 
preventing succession risks, and sustaining the relationship during crisis (Parkin et al., 2006). 29 
 30 
4.2. Effective inter-organisational collaborations are not accidental 31 
Developing relationships proactively takes time and commitment; there are often no 32 
‘natural’ incentives in this regard for water utilities in affluent countries since drinking water 33 
incidents with public health consequences are rare (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004).  34 
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Nevertheless, such incidents may occur regardless of the efforts to prevent them, and a crisis 1 
is not the optimal time to ‘exchange business cards’.  Without a platform of trust, sharing 2 
information and expertise, and open communication between agencies, unnecessary 3 
difficulties and additional risks are present during incident management (Jalba et al., 2010). 4 
In contrast, with the poor cooperation examples reported in the incidents we analysed, 5 
e.g. hiding or counterfeiting evidence, lying to regulators, or blocking media statements 6 
issued by other stakeholders (Jalba et al., 2010), we uncovered little evidence indicating that 7 
such behaviour would have been expected prior to the incident.  In general, any prior contacts 8 
between stakeholders seemed to have been professionally amiable even if technical concerns 9 
might have been present.  This was sometimes confirmed during study interviews.  Mistrust, 10 
poor communication, insufficient training and a suboptimal cooperation structure seemed to 11 
have only become apparent at the time of the incident (Jalba et al., 2010).  We learned that 12 
improvements were generally implemented after incidents to prevent re-occurrences, as part 13 
of the organisational learning process and/or under external pressure, i.e. Governmental 14 
investigations (Badenoch et al., 1990; Laing, 2002; LIHAG, 1989; LIHAG, 1990; McClellan, 15 
1998c; O'Connor, 2002b), or improved regulations (OMOE, 2003).  This is commendable, 16 
but reactive in approach. 17 
Discovering the reality of institutional relationships during incidents is itself an example 18 
of poor prevention.  Among participating organisations, approximately a quarter of water 19 
utilities and half of PHAs had not practised their emergency management arrangements in a 20 
joint exercise at the time of the interview.  Many of their representatives affirmed they 21 
exercised their emergency arrangements ‘enough’ when actual incidents occur, and believed 22 
that such an approach provides adequate practise for their needs.  Most of these organisations 23 
were found to lack any form of written bilateral agreements.  Interviewees from these 24 
organisations expressed confidence in the status quo based on their past incident management 25 
experiences.  However, the lack of formalised agreements, coupled with a lack of joint 26 
practise focusing on interagency collaboration, leaves many potential relationship gaps 27 
unrecognised.  This makes them vulnerable to events that may challenge institutional 28 
collaboration in the same manner as they did in the analysed past incidents. 29 
While it is impossible to prevent all undesirable developments, it is clear from the above 30 
that an informed, vigilant and inquisitive attitude regarding the quality of current interagency 31 
relationships would benefit both consumers and organisations involved in the area of drinking 32 
water.  An adaptation of prevention principles (Axelrod, 1984) for drinking water safety 33 
should recognise three stages of prevention, namely proactively promoting relationships, 34 
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periodically verifying the existing arrangements, and learning from collaboration challenges 1 
when they occur. 2 
Bardach (1998; 2001) addresses the question of whether successful inter-organisational 3 
collaborations are achieved reactively or purposefully.  Without negating the role of chance 4 
interactions, a proposed “craftsmanship” model suggests successful collaborations are more 5 
likely to be achieved through an active, rather than a passive, process.  This process is often 6 
conducted by visionary, committed individuals, skilled in the art of “boundary spanning” 7 
(Williams, 2002). 8 
The role of external pressures in developing institutional relationships among 9 
participating organisations was clearly identified and the presence of relationship advocates 10 
was correlated with a better recognition of the critical relationship components (Jalba et al., 11 
2010) than the average participating organisation, while the presence of external pressures 12 
did not significantly correlate to such understanding. 13 
Our findings clearly indicate that effective inter-organisational relationships are not 14 
accidental.  Good institutional collaborations identified among participating organisations did 15 
not develop neither randomly nor naturally.  In some cases, the appreciation of the value of 16 
good institutional relationships may have occurred as a result of past incidents aggravated by 17 
defective relations (Jalba et al., 2010).  More often, such appreciation developed in less 18 
dramatic circumstances, where an incident or close-call was eventually managed 19 
successfully, but post-incident analysis revealed suboptimal relationships, which may have 20 
delayed incident control and recovery. For example, political interference into the incident 21 
command system process led participating organisations to formulate a better structure and 22 
guidelines that would prevent politicians from disturbing incident response (Scottish 23 
Executive, 2002).  In some organisations, the presence of ‘enlightened individuals’ on both 24 
sides catalysed the process. 25 
Learning from experience is vitally important.  For provision of drinking water, incidents 26 
and close-calls (in one’s own organisation, or elsewhere) represent an important source of 27 
learning that is often underused.  Systematically learning from close-calls is at least as 28 
important as analysing generic, catastrophic scenarios, yet often risk managers may focus on 29 
the latter.  While the importance of learning from close calls as a risk management tool was 30 
advocated by many of the participating utility representatives, most PHA interviewees did not 31 
seem to recognise the critical role that this approach can play in preventing drinking water 32 
safety incidents.  Their lack of knowledge about how utilities in their area approach this 33 
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aspect of learning is likely to limit the extent to which the PHA can encourage and support a 1 
fully preventive risk management approach among their partners. 2 
While each have their place in developing a risk management culture, effective 3 
interagency collaborations are more likely to develop from jointly practising meaningful, 4 
likely scenarios based on past experiences, rather than relying only on the odd generic 5 
‘Hollywood-type’ disaster management exercise.  ‘Likely’ scenarios may also involve less 6 
resources, can be organised regularly, and will provide multiple opportunities for interaction 7 
between key people in both organisations.  Past incidents with collaboration difficulties may 8 
inform more meaningful and less repetitive scenarios whose practice will improve aspects of 9 
institutional relationships components and determinants that are critical to their mission. 10 
If developing an effective institutional relationship is rarely accidental, the same applies 11 
to maintaining the momentum of the relationship, or ‘sustaining innovation’ (Schall, 1997). 12 
An important challenge for participating organisations seemed to be keeping interagency 13 
relationships ‘alive’ when disasters or major incidents do not occur.  Relationships are 14 
dynamic entities, tested in time by routine incidents (as well as lack of) with rotation of staff 15 
in key positions. 16 
Successful ‘boundary-spanners’ (Williams, 2002) are skilled at identifying ways to 17 
maintain regular contact between organisations; this includes ‘orchestrating’ [artificial] 18 
opportunities to keep the momentum going (Table 3).  Creative managers find no shortage of 19 
opportunities in the space between organisational barriers because they are less bound by pre-20 
existing patterns and routines.  Such initiatives may include setting up ‘boundary 21 
organisations’ or ‘boundary objects’ (Cash et al., 2003) in the form of interdisciplinary bodies 22 
or collaborative projects that bring together organisations with the purpose of addressing 23 
common interests (Tables 3 and 4).  Cross-boundary entities filling gaps between 24 
organisations are more likely to engage parties by increasing the salience of information 25 
produced, credibility of initiative and a ensuring a more transparent process (Cash et al., 26 
2003).  In the area of drinking water, possible examples include local/regional water quality 27 
committees, organised seminars or training events on interdisciplinary topics of common 28 
interest, joint research projects or formulating joint emergency response guidelines.  Other 29 
initiatives may include inviting key people to become familiar with their own organisation’s 30 
operations, for example through a guided visit at the local water treatment plant. 31 
Many participants in this study failed to recognise succession risks to institutional 32 
relationships, particularly on the PHA side.  As Schall (1997) notes, rather than relying on 33 
key people’s immortality, responsible managers in charge of the institutional relationship 34 
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should use succession planning strategies.  In more proactive organisations, managers are 1 
actively looking for new potential champions of the relationship in their organisation, 2 
delegating them on a rotation basis to represent them in key interagency activities (be that 3 
regular communication, joint meetings, expertise sharing, or common projects), and investing 4 
in their training.  Creating multiple contact points between the partners establishes a wider 5 
support within each organisation, thus enhancing resilience.  Skilled managers also identify 6 
opportunities to ‘hardwire’ the relationship in organisational procedures, such as embedding 7 
interagency communication and interdisciplinary training in their culture.  By engaging key 8 
stakeholders in multi-agency activities, they establish a wider support in the community 9 
(Jalba et al., 2009).  Finally, by promoting recognition of the advantages of the relationship, 10 
its discontinuation may later be perceived as a strategic risk (Schall, 1997).  One could 11 
hypothesise that employing an active, coordinated approach to preserving the momentum of 12 
the relationship makes it difficult to cease even when confronted with difficult times and 13 
competing priorities. 14 
 15 
4.3. Regulation is necessary, but not sufficient in isolation 16 
Adopting regulations and guidelines that require stakeholders to work together on a 17 
common task (e.g. WSPs, ERPs) is a step toward promoting an environment where more 18 
institutional contacts occur (Bartram et al., 2009; Jalba et al., 2009; NHMRC, 2004b; 19 
USEPA, 2004a; USEPA, 2004c; WHO, 2008).  Regulatory frameworks may encourage 20 
interagency collaboration to complete their requirements; however there is less certainty 21 
about what will happen once mandated documents are developed.  Would introducing more 22 
regulations that require agencies to connect take care of all institutional relationship 23 
deficiencies noticed in past incidents?  Will ‘indirectly mandating’ interagency cooperation 24 
via requirements such as WSPs, ERPs, vulnerability assessments and so on ensure that water 25 
utilities and their stakeholders will develop all necessary components of an effective 26 
relationship?  These questions raise the issue of whether effective interagency relations are 27 
more likely to be achieved reactively or purposefully.  This is complex and may require 28 
further research; however some preliminary observations can be offered on the basis of this 29 
study. 30 
Prior to the development of a ‘risk management culture’,  utilities and their oversight 31 
agencies involved in the incidents did not operate in a legislative vacuum.  During the last 32 
three decades when these incidents occurred, regulations were generally in place to mandate, 33 
for example, oversight of the safety of water supply operations, or empowering PHAs to 34 
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investigate and enforce public health protection if they suspected that the water supply is 1 
unsafe.  Indeed, relationships between key people existed in many cases even before the 2 
incidents we studied (Jalba et al., 2010; Laing, 2002; McClellan, 1998c; O'Connor, 2002a).  3 
What was missing, however, was an agreed standard of what a meaningful interaction 4 
between agencies represented as a means to help them discharge their mandates successfully. 5 
Both environmental and public health enforcement officers had a ‘relationship’ with 6 
Walkerton water supply operators, which at that time was regarded as acceptable (O'Connor, 7 
2002a; Perkel, 2002).  The latent deficiencies only became apparent when the water supply 8 
became severely contaminated with pathogens (O'Connor, 2002a). While the results of 9 
regulatory inspections of both Walkerton and North Battleford water systems prior to the 10 
incidents were inadequate (Laing, 2002; O'Connor, 2002a), it is easy to forget fearing a 11 
problem that rarely occurs (Reason, 1997), and accept the status quo.  The authority of 12 
enforcement officers may have been real, but in the ‘real world’ there are many factors that 13 
may limit their effectiveness.  In the absence of a true collaborative relationship, both 14 
persuasion and regulatory coercion are less likely to produce the desired changes. 15 
Rather than increasing regulation, a different mindset may be required from water 16 
utilities and oversight agencies alike (Pollard et al., 2009).  A productive relationship differs 17 
from a ‘mandated’ relationship.  Should interagency relationships remain unrecognised as an 18 
essential ‘ingredient’ of successful risk management in the area of drinking water, 19 
development of WSPs, ERPs or vulnerability assessments may become another lost 20 
opportunity.  As Pollard et al. (2009) note, introducing new standards such as WSPs while 21 
ignoring related human factors may not prevent them from becoming another cursory or 22 
superficial exercise, i.e. something to produce, file and then move on doing things as before, 23 
or even documenting under a new template what the organisation already does, rather than 24 
stimulating improvements.  Drawing from the experience of implementing the international 25 
quality standard ISO 9000 and the introduction of the hazards analysis and critical control 26 
point (HACCP) approach, Pollard et al. (2009) emphasizes that both meaningful and 27 
superficial implementation are possible, depending on the organisational ‘mindfulness’ 28 
culture. 29 
If effective inter-organisational relationships are clearly recognised as important for the 30 
successful provision of drinking water, they are more likely to be sought purposefully than 31 
being left to chance.  If organisations choose to pursue them in the same way that they pursue 32 
other functions such as treatment operations, business opportunities, risk management or 33 
public relations, then they may take steps to stimulate and ‘hardwire’ the collaborative 34 
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performance of their staff and of the organisation as a whole.  Mindful organisations may 1 
choose to select, train and reward their staff based on their collaborative performance (Daley, 2 
2009), such as interdisciplinary communication skills, engaging stakeholders, and building 3 
trust in their product.  Mutual recognition of the importance of interagency relations between 4 
water utilities, oversight agencies, and other stakeholders, is also likely to encourage sharing 5 
of expertise and critical information. 6 
 7 
4.4. Assessing relationship performance 8 
Awareness, of the quality of one’s organisation institutional relationships, as well as of 9 
the type of relationship gaps that aggravated past incidents and how they occurred is likely to 10 
be the most powerful motivator for developing effective interagency relationships.  A 11 
systematic verification of effective interagency relationships was recommended in Pollard et 12 
al.  (2009) based on research findings and guidance literature on inter-organisational 13 
relationship performance (Daley, 2009; ISO, 2007; OECD, 2003).  The proposed framework 14 
for performance evaluation of institutional relationships was based on outcome and activity 15 
relationship performance indicators during both normal and emergency times.  This 16 
framework was designed to ensure that all six relationship components we introduced are 17 
considered when water utilities formulate their local risk management strategy relating to 18 
cooperation with regulatory agencies.  19 
 20 
4.5. Interdisciplinary training 21 
Apart from in-house training, institutional relations may be promoted by involving the 22 
other party’s representatives in common research and community projects by implementing 23 
interdisciplinary training for key people involved in the relationship, and by discussing issues 24 
of mutual interest such as monitoring and controlling emerging pathogens, or concerns over 25 
long-term effects of chemicals or disinfection by-products (DBPs).  The related practical 26 
skills may be developed through incident and close call debriefing, case studies, joint 27 
exercises on emergency response plans, or responding to mutual assistance agreements with 28 
other peer organisations. 29 
The success of such training is best tested using simulations based on realistic scenarios, 30 
preferably adapted from real incidents that happened in their organisation or elsewhere. The 31 
use of realistic joint simulations is likely to give a practical understanding of major training 32 
themes, such as each other’s response protocols, how to identify resources, understanding 33 
which entities are likely to be involved in an incident, matching epidemiology findings with 34 
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distribution infrastructure, challenges of risk communication with a potentially distrusting 1 
public, as well as limitations of water quality monitoring, of data interpretation and of the risk 2 
assessment approach. 3 
Finally, key people involved in the institutional relationship must have a practical and 4 
realistic view of what the other party needs to know, can possibly know and can be expected 5 
to be able to do in a drinking water incident, and what expertise and resources can be 6 
expected from them.  One of the findings of our research was that mutual expectations in 7 
terms of training, expertise and ability to address concerns may not always match the 8 
standard training provided for professionals on the other side, or even with what can 9 
realistically be expected from them.  This leaves many grey areas of expertise that may not 10 
always be obvious during routine business, but which might become apparent during a 11 
challenging situation. 12 
Water operators may not always be able to: identify the source of contamination in the 13 
water system (Carrique-Mas et al., 2003); unconditionally support a prolonged or ‘blanket’ 14 
boil order that as a precaution covers many areas where the risk is highly unlikely but cannot 15 
be entirely excluded (McClellan, 1998a; McClellan, 1998b); decide what is the relevant 16 
information that must be shared with other agencies (Laing, 2002); or corroborate 17 
epidemiologically derived indications of water supply contamination with possible water 18 
system barrier failures (Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004). 19 
On their side, PHA personnel may not always be able to: justify the epidemiological link 20 
of an outbreak to the water supply beyond reasonable doubt (e.g. South Devon 21 
cryptosporidiosis outbreak in Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004), judge the risk of transmission via 22 
water in comparison with other exposure pathways (e.g. Victoria toxoplasmosis outbreak in 23 
Hrudey and Hrudey, 2004), or provide laboratory support for detecting pathogens that may be 24 
routinely detected in clinical samples.  This is because a detection method from water 25 
samples may not be available, or because pathogens multiply in humans, but not in the water, 26 
so the negative predictive value (probability of a negative result being truly negative) of the 27 
method is much lower for water quality testing than for stool sample testing (Allen et al., 28 
2000). 29 
 30 
4.6. Study limitations 31 
Adopting a qualitative approach to studying the collaboration between water utilities and 32 
PHAs has helped to identify a multitude of themes.  At the same time, the generalisation of 33 
findings of this study is limited by purposively sampling a selection of organisations in order 34 
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to investigate a variety of organisational cultures.  Another study limitation relates to 1 
interviewing only the most experienced people as far as the institutional relationship is 2 
concerned.  The relationship between better interagency collaboration and safer drinking 3 
water has been explored here only qualitatively but our findings reinforce the intuition that 4 
better collaboration has merit and is needed in most cases. 5 
 6 
5.  Conclusions 7 
Would better institutional relationships have avoided the high profile water quality 8 
incidents of recent decades discussed in Hrudey and Hrudey (2004)?  Even optimal 9 
interagency relationships cannot prevent contamination from entering the water supply, and 10 
no relationships can assure contamination-proof systems.  Equally, no amount of 11 
collaboration (or technology, for that matter) can prevent unforeseen hazards such as a 12 
pathogenic Cryptosporidium-carrying rabbit infiltrating the waterworks (Chalmers et al., 13 
2009) or a relief worker depositing treatment chemicals in the wrong place in the system 14 
(LIHAG, 1989), though certain technological and managerial improvements would have 15 
made such situations less likely. 16 
On the other hand, with the Walkerton incident as an example, poor institutional 17 
relationships can result in excessive energy, time and resources being spent trying to obtain 18 
the right information about what went on, thereby severely delaying control of an outbreak, 19 
resulting in high public inquiry costs, and an expensive out-of-court settlement of a class-20 
action lawsuit (O'Connor, 2002a).  In the North Battleford incident, much time was 21 
unnecessarily wasted; by PHA investigators who were unaware of drinking water system 22 
problems (Laing, 2002).  Poorly managed interagency relations in the Sydney incident led to 23 
a loss of institutional credibility and costs of several Government inquiries (Hrudey and 24 
Hrudey, 2004).  In the Camelford incident, poor interagency communication led to a serious 25 
loss of credibility, costs of Government inquiries, psychological and psychosomatic 26 
suffering, and legal action (COT, 2005; DOH, 2005).  So we conclude: 27 
 28 
(1) A responsible water utility fosters good relationships with their PHA counterparts.  A 29 
responsible PHA is likely to respond in-kind. 30 
(2) An effective institutional relationship is often determined by the successful 31 
achievement of at least six relationship components: trust, communication, shared 32 
expertise, common interdisciplinary training, supporting regulation and proactivity.  33 
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Together, these components will act as a multiple-barrier protection from inter-1 
organisational conflicts. 2 
(3) Some of the participating organisations in this study demonstrated practices that 3 
sought intuitively to develop these components.  However, most lacked a targeted 4 
approach and, as a result, not all relationship components were found to be optimal. 5 
(4) The use of risk terminology does not necessarily imply the existence of a risk 6 
management culture, and meanings can vary greatly.  A common risk management 7 
paradigm may need to be formulated regarding collaboration between water utilities 8 
and PHAs. 9 
(5) The pros and cons of the interventionist versus naturalist approach to interagency 10 
relations for drinking water may remain a subject for philosophical debates.  11 
However, the study evidence clearly supports the adage that ‘prevention is better than 12 
cure’.  A ‘natural’, evolutionary, process of developing inter-organisational 13 
relationships may well be advocated by ignoring the ‘red flags’ identified in this 14 
study.  On the other hand, proactively implementing the lessons from past incidents 15 
and the successful current practices would clearly reduce inherent adverse 16 
consequences. 17 
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Table 1: Opportunities for developing a relationship between a water utility and a PHA 1 
 2 
Opportunity Examples 
Legislation   Requirements to develop WSPs; 
 Regulatory requirement to develop a common 
MoU; 
 Working out joint incident response protocols; 
 Developing emergency response plans and 
vulnerability assessments (particularly after 
September 11, 2001); 
 
Incidents  Waterborne outbreaks (e.g. Cryptosporidiosis). 
 Successful management of a drinking water and 
health crisis that involved the PHA; 
 Desire to understand each other’s business after 
suboptimal incident management coordination; 
 
Public concerns  Concerns about lead contamination in distribution; 
 Concerns about Cryptosporidium from the AIDS 
community, working on a common communication 
strategy; 
 Concerns on long-term effects of disinfection by-
products (DBPs) or fluoride; 
 Health concerns over intensive agriculture projects 
that would impact source water quality; 
 
Requests for 
assistance 
 Uncertainties on interpretation of Cryptosporidium 
tests resulting in working out a common protocol; 
 Water utility requesting PHA to interpret recent 
studies on new DBPs; 
 PHA requesting assistance with water samples 
analysis for recreational water or other non-
drinking water related issues; 
 PHA requesting assistance on borderline projects 
(e.g. lead contamination from building plumbing). 
 
Joint projects  Community drinking water safety educational 
projects; 
 Drinking water safety research projects; 
 
Other  Environmental regulator inspections that pointed 
out deficiencies, resulting in the involvement of 
the PHA in discussions over upgrading water and 
sewage systems;  
 Utility paying for PHA staff dedicated to drinking 
water quality. 
 
  3 
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Table 2: Views of both parties on PHA expectations of the water utility 
 
Expectations 
category 
PHA participants views Utility participants views 
Incident 
management 
 Able to recognise when drinking water contamination occurs; 
 Will perform a risk assessment related to any contamination 
event; 
 Is able to correlate water quality testing results with operational 
conditions; 
 Provides recommendations for public health protection; 
 Able to provide assurance when the system functions 
normally; 
 Identify location of the system problem and isolates it 
from the rest of the system;  
 Explain issues, concerns and options from utility 
perspective; 
 Clearly define the area of service potentially affected; 
 Propose control options in the case of public health 
risks; 
 
Knowledge   Is able to describe the relevant properties of the chemical of 
concern (e.g. source, formation, removal options, and how it is 
regulated); 
 Has information on emerging pathogens; 
 Able to describe contaminant and know how to test for 
it; 
 Well-informed on common problems; 
 Well-informed on water industry best practices; 
 
Responsiveness  Provide timely and accurate information;  
 Respond promptly to PHA inquiries; 
 Provide timely notification of adverse results, investigations 
results and any incident control decisions; 
 Investigate for water system problems when suspicion is raised, 
e.g. by enhancing sampling and testing; 
 Provide PHA with adverse monitoring results and 
related technical and operational data in a timely, 
honest and transparent manner; 
 Prompt notification of any unusual events with 
potential public health consequences;  
 Prompt investigation of water system problems; 
 Enhancing water quality sampling and testing;  
 
Public support  Unconditionally supports PHA public notices (including  Will not remove or try to remove a boil water notice 
34 
 
conditions to lift them); 
 Participates in joint media statements; 
until the PHA is convinced that their water is safe; 
 
Partnership 
approach 
 Complete transparency in communication;  
 Invites PHA input in their investigation (e.g. sampling strategy), 
to discuss control options (e.g. treatment, system shutdown), and 
their consequences; 
 Participates in PHA investigation by describing the water system, 
current operating conditions and reporting recent system changes;  
 Participates in corroborating and interpreting epidemiological 
data within the context of their system; 
 Utility laboratory will cooperate with the public health lab to 
develop a pathogen detection method and serotyping techniques. 
 Offers full cooperation throughout the incident. 
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Table 3: Views of both parties about utility expectations of the PHA 
 
Expectations 
category 
Utility participants views PHA participants views 
Professional advice  Justify epidemiological connection of illness to water 
 Assess health risk from particular water contaminants 
 Treatment removal of unusual contaminant 
 Advice on public notification (e.g. high-risk groups) 
 Advise sampling locations based on case distribution; 
 Characterize unusual or emerging pathogens;  
 Advise on how to detect new chemicals and emerging 
pathogens in drinking water, and possible sources of 
contamination; 
 Advise on improving water treatment;  
 Assess health risks in an incident 
 Identify vulnerable populations 
 Decide if there is a public health emergency; 
 Help utility define effective control options 
 Describe the pathogen and its potential for 
transmission through drinking water; 
 Clarify whether an alternative water source is 
needed; 
 Interpret pathogen testing results for raw/treated 
water 
 Justify epidemiological link to drinking water 
 Advise on water treatment and control options for 
unusual chemicals and pathogens; 
 
Incident 
management support 
 Provide laboratory support;  
 Provide assistance with specific water tests (e.g. 
Cryptosporidium genotyping); 
 
 Enhance disease surveillance 
 Disseminate information quickly to the public;  
 Facilitate distribution of drinking water alerts to 
particular groups (e.g. dialysis patients), or 
businesses (e.g. industrial developments); 
 Provide resources to the ICS;  
Public support  Present a joint front during public communications 
 Provide health education to the public (including 
contaminant fact sheets on pathogens and chemicals of 
concern);  
 Protect water utility customer confidentiality; 
 
 Educate the public; 
 Mitigate rumors and public concerns about health 
risks; 
 Present a unified front in public; 
Partnership  Clearly outline their expectations and be  Provide location of cases 
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approach reasonable/realistic about what can be achieved; 
 Notify the utility on potential waterborne disease; 
 Provide location of cases in an outbreak 
 Provide updates on population impact in a waterborne 
outbreak; 
 Place drinking water risks in the general public health 
context by weighting drinking water against other 
exposure pathways (e.g. nitrosamines in food);  
 Seek clarification when water monitoring and 
epidemiological data are incongruent; 
 
 Provide related disease statistics 
 Notify on potentially related cases; 
 Periodically update water utility on the public 
health investigation; 
 
Regulatory support   Advise on regulatory guidelines; 
 Issue public alerts (e.g. boil order) 
 Notify general practitioners in their area. 
 Assist water utility with reaching out to other Government 
agencies (e.g. catchment management); 
 Facilitate contact with local hospitals, other PHAs, 
and other Government agencies 
 
